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Go Eliot, Go!

Sometimes the most useful information is in plain sight—as long as you know where to look for it.

. . . and

“One of the non-negotiables I will impose [is single sign-on],” Jardines said. “We may not take the five or six separate networks and tell them, ‘You have to do away with yours,’ [but] we’re looking for connectivity.”

. . . and

“It is very tempting to equate classification with value. The higher the classification, the higher the value is a common, albeit erroneous, assumption,” Jardines said. “Classification has nothing to do with the value of information; it only indicates the degree of damage done to national security should the sources and methods used to collect it be compromised.”

Read it all, think about the previous post, and dream of the future.

P.S. Author fake-name alert . . . Patience Wait?

Get Some!

Uncle Cofer wants you!

Upon further reflection, I have to add, what a joy it must be to deploy with such an outfit. Imagine every Army (or Marine) deployment you’ve ever been on only without the hurry-up-and-wait, the endless paperwork, the outrageously clumsy and oudated equipment, and the drudgery.

How successful would such an endeavor be? If the MPRI and Sandline examples is any indication (the success in fighting, not the subsequent scandal) probably pretty bloody great.

Run to your library and check out a book by Peter Singer . . .

It Works Both Ways

I won’t attempt to pile on the good work that has been done here and here in addressing those would wave a dismissive hand at the public release of captured media. I’ll merely point out to all the nay-sayers and unoriginal thinkers that there is nothing stopping you from forming your own Army and producing your own analysis. Contrary to popular belief the best way to refute the work of your opposites is to produce something at least as substantial as what is being arrayed against you; not shouting “nanny nanny boo boo . . .”. To put it more plainly: don’t bring a wet noodle to a gun fight.

I would delve into more “inside baseball” but there is a line I am unwilling to cross. Suffice it to say that it is a safe bet that anonymous probably doesn’t work for living (post a comment if you need me to explain the euphemism).

HLS: Serious or Not Serious II

Installing radiation detectors at U.S. entry points is taking too long and costing too much, says a congressional watchdog agency whose undercover investigators breached security by slipping nuclear material into the United States.

In a test last year, the small amounts of cesium-137, which is used in industrial gauges, triggered radiation alarms in Texas and Washington state. The material was enough to make two small “dirty bombs,” officials said, yet U.S. customs agents permitted the investigators to enter the United States because they were tricked with counterfeit documents.

Does This Compute?

According to FBI chief information officer Zalmai Azmi, the agency lacks the funds necessary to deploy essential technology, such as e-mail, for its investigators. Azmi said the bureau’s annual budget of $10 billion for unclassified networks barely covers costs and can only provide e-mail for 22,000 of its 30,000 employees. The FBI has set up computer kiosk at field offices that cannot afford a computer for everyone; all 56 field offices should be connected to the Internet by the end of 2006.

I’m sorry but $10 BILLION isn’t enough to provide 30,000 people with email and ‘Net access? Clearly something was lost in the translation between speech and print; that or they are being terribly cavalier with an amount that by any accounting standards is “real money.”

What’s that? They ARE spending like drunken sailors? Says who?

The FBI has been paying consultancy invoices for IT contractors without any attempt to assess the validity of the charges, creating an overpayment of $10.1m

Oh.

JJA Speaks

Commentary on the released docs from beyond the grave.

That CIA-LOC IPO is on the Horizon

Did I mention that the gargoyles are here?

Avast!

If you or someone you know is up on naval history – in particular piracy issues - from the1700-1800s, please drop me a line. Working on a little side writing project and need some expertise. You can be as anonymous as you want to be.

Catching Up with Random Bits (Update)

On the road the last few days meeting up with some old colleagues and hanging with the Agora (thanks all). The real computer security threat in the Pacific Northwest? The static charge released when two hundred computer security experts in an auditorium remove their fleece jackets at the same time.

Got about four days of data to go through which will probably lead to countless posts, but wanted you to get out a couple quick bits before the week starts:

• Army of Davids book review: It made me want to quit my day job.

• Terrorist cyber capabilities: Not so ‘l33t after all.

• Released captured media: Yes, I am excited about the potential. However, as every radio host has reminded me, the potential for running off half-cocked is also there. Any discrete item can be viewed as a bombshell, but basing your assessment on what was or was not going on in Iraq prior to the war on one document is a mistake. Aggregate a bunch of docs that all paint a similar picture and you’re doing a lot better. Extend this to a broader base, apply some more serious methodology, and I’ll be happy to start pimp-slapping nay-sayers with you. I’m not discounting the efforts of those Davids who have been taking shots at this, but this needs more rigor, much more data, and a modicum of organization.

Also consider this: We’re supposedly getting data that has been labeled “no intelligence value.” We have to take Uncle Sam’s word for it since the HARMONY descriptions aren’t complete. If the gov’t considers these items worthless, what are we to assume?

- These items are all so blatantly false that no one in the IC believes they are true

- These items are all true, but they so don’t fit with what the IC thought was going on through classified sources, that they’ve been rejected

- There is a lot more data that we cannot get that suggests these items are worthless

When dealing in the world of mist and shadow the last case is always a probability (.3). The second case has happened on more than one occasion, so rank that high up on the probability scale (.7). For the first case to be true pretty much every piece of paper (or other form of storage media) in the country would have had to have been faked. In such an environment, how do you conduct business (.1)? If I can carve out the time I’ll try to put a poll up on the GI discussion groups and let you all vote on the issue.

Update: My friend R.N. smacks me up-side the head with an obvious stick:

“The docs are marked “NIV” for ISG requirements dummy. If it wasn’t on Dr. Kay’s shopping list, they probably were not looking for it. People look for what the boss wants.”

Low Speed, High Drag

A classified Pentagon study analyzing the effectiveness of Special Operations forces has found that the military’s counterterrorism effort is hampered by bureaucratic duplication, officials said, citing in particular an overlap between new government centers.

The study also found evidence of broad resistance to the Special Operations Command’s new counterterrorism role, from regional military commands and from other parts of the government’s sprawling defense and intelligence apparatus.

The findings were viewed as so provocative that the classified report has not been distributed widely, even among officials with the security clearance needed to read such internal reviews, Pentagon and military officials said. The study was initially ordered by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.

Oh how the truth hurts.

Pentagon and military officials who have read the study say that the mission of the new Center for Special Operations, a large military headquarters created in Florida in 2003, mirrors the work of the new National Counterterrorism Center, established by executive order in 2004. The military center is intended to bring together elements of the armed services under a three-star general; the intelligence center answers to John D. Negroponte, the director of national intelligence.

The review, conducted by a retired four-star officer, Gen. Wayne A. Downing Jr., grew out of a budget and strategy briefing last October during which Mr. Rumsfeld expressed grave concerns over the readiness of the troops and the effectiveness of the Special Operations Command’s counterterrorist operations.

“The Rumsfeld family crest probably says something like, ‘More, and faster,’ ” said a senior Pentagon official involved in the policy debate over the role of the command, known as Socom in military circles. “So what he thinks about Socom is, ‘With all this new money and all these extra people and all this wider latitude to maneuver, why haven’t you won the war on terror for me yet?’ ” […]

I’m told that Robert Kaplan has documented at least part of the answer, but I haven’t picked up a copy yet.

According to Pentagon civilians and military officers who have read the Downing study, the review found “a tremendous duplication of effort” in the government and military that overlaps with assignments given the Special Operations Command.

More broadly, the review found that the government-wide national security bureaucracy still does not respond rapidly and effectively to the new requirements of the counterterrorism campaign. The report said more streamlining was necessary across a broad swath of the civilian bureaucracy and military, including civilians in the policy office that reports to Mr. Rumsfeld and the office of the secretary of defense, the military organization that reports to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the regional combatant commanders and even the National Security Council staff at the White House. […]

Seeking answers to his concerns, Mr. Rumsfeld asked General Downing, who is known for his blunt, independent style, to conduct the classified review. […]

If you are going to argue for breaking china, you might as well get the biggest bull you can find.

Another official who read the review said it took to task senior civilian and military leaders who demanded “responsive, flexible, agile operations around the world, yet tolerate a staff system that gives you exactly the opposite.”

Under a Unified Command Plan signed by President Bush, the Special Operations Command now “leads, plans, synchronizes, and as directed, executes global operations against terrorist networks.” But the Special Operations Command, based in Tampa, Fla., “does not have the power to do what it has been assigned,” said yet another official in paraphrasing the report. […]

The flexibility it takes to bury one’s head up one’s fourth-point-of-contact is incredible, yet these same people can be some incredibly inflexible when it comes to making the slightest change in order to satisfy customers who are in dire need of such support. Why be responsive when you can be obstructionist, do less work, and still get paid? Funny how that works. Funny and sad. Good thing most of those tools don’t have sipr connections. ;- )

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