Sharing (Again)
July 31, 2006
Nearly five years after 9/11, reports show the federal government has made limited progress on sharing terrorism information because of uncertainty about what to share, and how to do so without infringing on civil liberties.
States are filling in some of the gaps by setting up intelligence fusion centers, though those activities also are stirring privacy concerns.
Bringing together disparate bits of intelligence to identify terrorist plots in advance — connecting the dots, as it’s been called — emerged as one of the top security priorities for the nation following the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. The Homeland Security Department was created in 2002, and the Information-Sharing Environment in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in 2004, to stimulate the data-sharing that would help in making those connections.
However, several recent reports have called attention to significant shortcomings in those efforts:
» July 13. The Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age called for a new paradigm for information-sharing, calling federal guidelines insufficient. “The government still has not taken many key steps to meet the challenges of sharing information to prevent terrorism while protecting civil liberties,” the task force said.
»June 28. The DHS inspector general reported that the federal Homeland Security Information Network, the department’s premier information-sharing network, is ineffective in supporting information-sharing among federal, state and local officials. The network is not being used regularly because there is lack of trust among users. “Users are confused and frustrated,” the report said.
»April 17. A Government Accountability Office report said that federal policies for information-sharing against terrorism are fragmented and applied haphazardly. “The nation still lacks government wide policies and processes to help agencies integrate the myriad of ongoing efforts,” GAO wrote.
It’s pretty straight forward actually; Allow collectors to only collect, stop permitting data “ownership,” and make sharing and collaboration a performance metric (alternately, get rid of duplicative analytical elements so that you have no choice but to deliver).
HISN, the Department’s solution to ISACs. Keep dreaming. ISACs barely work and then only after the formal stuff is over and the booze and cigars have been handed out. When sharing could get you pilloried (or worse) and the agency pushing the issue can’t get its own house in order it doesn’t help the situation. People share with those they trust and trust comes after a sit-down, not a dial-in. It isn’t very 21st century, but it is what works. Apply IT to the mix and now you are obliged to record and store all that sharing and in the passage of time and the loss of context, you could get screwed. I am reminded of my own days of membership in an IC “double-secret underground partnership” cohort; key people, no agenda, no records. It worked.
Iraqi WMDs (Again)
July 31, 2006
FronPage Symposium. Gaubatz goes off the end a bit, but the rest do a crack-up job. Key points:
Ledeen:
The truly amazing fact is that the White House is very obviously opposed to revisiting these questions. They say they want to look forward, not back into the past. But this wrongheaded view undermines a good deal of potential support for moving forward aggressively, because it deprives them of the ability to say that a good deal of what they said in the past was true. Once again, the White House fails to tell its own story effectively.
Gaubatz:
When we went to war with Iraq two of the goals were to remove Saddam Hussein and to capture him if possible. The second goal was to locate WMD. Mr. Ledeen makes an excellent point pertaining to classifying WMD being found in Iraq. Any WMD found should not be classified. The American people need to be aware of any updates in regards to these weapons. When Saddam Hussein was captured we did not classify this and release it several months later. The announcement was made immediately. The WMD issue is no different. If we locate one chemical shell or 500 chemical shells an announcement must be made.
Joscelyn:
Many have trumpeted the failure to find significant quantities of WMD as evidence that the Bush administration “lied.” This is demonstrably false on its face as anyone could quickly locate similar claims being made by any number of foreign governments, members of the Clinton administration including the former president himself, as well as members of the U.S. intelligence community long before the current Bush administration even came into being.
McCarthy:
The only thing we really know about Iraq (and much of the region) is that our intelligence there was grossly inadequate. The bizarre and sad thing about all of this is that we appear willing, as a nation, to have the history of matters of great consequence “definitively” written on the basis of this blatantly insufficient record. That is not history; it is fiction. Obviously, if there are matters of operational intelligence that need to be withheld due to bonafide military necessity, then that has to be done. But if, due to an insurgency with a strong jihadist component, we are still (over three years after Saddam’s fall) considering to be “operational” intelligence about terror ties and weapons, there must be plenty there of interest. On the other hand, if we are withholding information because it would be embarrassing to the intelligence community or other officials because the positions they took prior to March 2003 are unsustainable, that similarly means what passes for the conventional wisdom is wrong and must be corrected.
The Geezer Brigade
July 31, 2006
The Federal Page addresses issues related to retirees and in particular IC staffers.
With substantial numbers of baby boomers likely to leave government for retirement in the next 10 years, the Bush administration and Congress are looking for ways to keep experienced hands.
Most federal agencies have plans to ensure that critical jobs are filled as employees retire, but some officials are concerned that staff shortfalls could develop and hamper the government’s response to a national crisis. As an example, they point to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which suffered from lax staffing practices in the months before Hurricane Katrina. […]
The director of national intelligence recently approved hiring retirees to fill critical jobs, Ronald P. Sanders, the intelligence community’s personnel policy chief, told the House subcommittee. The 2004 intelligence reform law authorized a National Intelligence Reserve Corps for temporary assignments without salary offsets.
Retirees were a big help in the immediate post 9/11 days, taking up the slack in all those mission areas that we couldn’t stop doing but couldn’t devote the time to. For very fundamental work, particularly technical stuff, you can’t beat a guy who in his prime probably invented part of the technology you’re trying to assess.
The dark side of this practice comes when, as I mentioned below, you recycle the same old managers and executives who cut their teeth fighting bureaucratic battles, not mission-oriented ones. Pointy-Haired-Bosses are a dime a dozen and the thought of bringing back the people who managed us into all the failures of the last few decades makes me ill.
A Very Smart Start
July 31, 2006
The FBI broke with one of its most storied traditions Wednesday, announcing changes in its top management that, rather than elevating onetime agents, tapped officials with extensive experience outside of the bureau for several key positions.
The realignment, unveiled by Director Robert S. Mueller III, put nonagents — including one who is a former oil company executive and another who rose through the ranks of the CIA — at the helms of three of the bureau’s five major branches.
The moves were a tacit acknowledgment of troubles the FBI has had keeping up with advancements in areas such as science, computer technology and human resources.
As I hope to be able to communicate in an upcoming print piece, we need to stop recycling our national security staff and start re-invigorating it. Kicking the old-timers who gave you the last series of intelligence failures upstairs will only result in one conclusion: more failures.
Classic
July 31, 2006
(Thanks to Tom for a well-needed laugh)
What do you do when people stop listening to your drivel? Start a slap-fight. I’ll let you all decide which character is Larry and which is Michael.
This is what happens . . .
July 28, 2006
. . . when ex-single-source analysts try to deal with multi-source intel:
In a screed Rolling Stone is passing off as journalism, James Bamford becomes the latest in a growing crowd of hacks to smear our friend Michael Ledeen. […]
But this [Italian documents] forgery nonsense is a sideshow compared to Bamford’s ludicrous account of Michael’s December 2001 trip to Rome . . . Bamford claims his interview with Michael marked the first time Ledeen had discussed the Rome trip. This is just silly. The trip has been recounted numerous times and in numerous places, often by Michael himself and, most recently, in a page-one article in the July 13 edition of the Wall Street Journal.
Full account at NRO.
He did a fine job with the Puzzle Palace, which leads me to believe that maybe he’s not applying his full skill set here. On the other hand, if he’s getting sloppy it must mean he’s not really into his arguments, or the good doctor slipped something into his coffee (via CQ).
Just snippets for now
July 28, 2006
Man oh man, you take 48 hours for a business trip and 480 hours of work pile up. For the time being you’ll have to be satisfied with a few snippets I can post during lunch and too-brief down-periods. Right now just a note of comfort for everyone on the west coast that CTU Lives!
The Joint Regional Intelligence Center, the first such center in the nation, opened its doors Thursday to help more than 200 law enforcement agencies coordinate their efforts to prevent terrorist attacks.
HLS: Serious or Not Serious XVII
July 24, 2006
You could be on a secret government database or watch list for simply taking a picture on an airplane. Some federal air marshals say they’re reporting your actions to meet a quota, even though some top officials deny it.
The air marshals, whose identities are being concealed, told 7NEWS that they’re required to submit at least one report a month. If they don’t, there’s no raise, no bonus, no awards and no special assignments.
“Innocent passengers are being entered into an international intelligence database as suspicious persons, acting in a suspicious manner on an aircraft … and they did nothing wrong,” said one federal air marshal.
If this is true, and few Air Marshal stories have turned out not to be, we’ve actually gone retrograde as far as air security goes. People gotta make a living, but every Marshal with a lick of integrity ought to give serious consideration to ignoring this directive or quitting. Were this an intelligence collection operation (and in a sense it is) it would be akin “padding” which is a sure-fire way to find yourself unemployed after a long stint mowing grass and picking up cigarette butts. If you can’t trust the data, you can’t trust the analysis, which means at this point we’re essentially guessing who is dangerous and who is not. Comforting thought as I prepare for a flight to NYC.
Another Indicator
July 24, 2006
Courtesy of Ralph Peters in the NY Post:
* Famed for its penetration, Israeli intelligence failed this time. It didn’t detect the new weapons Iran and Syria had provided to Hezbollah, from anti-ship missiles to longer-range rockets. And, after years of spying, it couldn’t find Hezbollah.
This should set off global alarm bells: If Hezbollah can hide rockets, Iran can hide nukes.
How Much Pain?
July 24, 2006
Fighting cyber-crime requires an Enron-like scandal to force the hand of legislators, the FBI argued today.
Only after such an event could the necessary reforms be made to allow authorities to effectively battle online criminals, according to FBI special agent Shéna Boswell-Crowe. […]
“I do not think that [cyber-crime] has had its day. There has not been something that’s large enough to generate large-scale awareness. Awareness is increasing, but we have not had that large event that makes people think: ‘This is really bad.’”
Spend any time with INFOSEC types and they’ll talk your ear off about how severe (or not) these issues are; the same holds true for Info War types (I’ve got a foot in both camps). The tie-in to intelligence and broader security matters comes when you start entertaining the idea of what it would take to bring about broad, deep, and serious reform. One would have thought that 9/11 would have been the impetus to dust out the cobwebs and grease the wheels, but so far I see a lot of use of Brasso and little else. If 9/11 wasn’t enough to move us forward, try this thought experiment: how bad a kick in the groin would we have to suffer before real change is brought about?
There must be a book in there somewhere . . .
