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Jihad Simulator 2.0

All of these plots, successful and otherwise, contradict a prevalent theory in counter-terrorism circles that all the skills necessary to conduct a successful attack can be learned in the comfort of a terrorist’s own home. This paradigm is based on the belief that internet technology has removed the need for terrorist training camps by creating a virtual safe haven where youth can self-radicalize and self-train. Bomb making and target selection are ‘easy.’ An attacker can simply download instructions and maps off the internet, purchase readily available materials to construct the explosive, and voilá, a fully formed terrorist emerges from behind his computer, competent to conceive, fund, plan, and execute a sophisticated terrorist attack. Such streamlined attack planning puts law enforcement at a disadvantage by decreasing the window of opportunity to detect and disrupt a plot.

Anyone know anyone who tracks these issues who actually thinks this? I think the general consensus among most serious practitioners is that IT is one useful tool for a variety of pre-op activities. A Google map and Army map reading skills allowed me to navigate my way through a portion of NYC recently, but the simple matrix of streets and avenues on the neat and clean map and the illusion of closeness was a far cry from reality on the ground. Anyone who has taken any kind of CBT at their jobs knows the futility of actually learning and/or retaining something via online means (different from asynchronus distance learning with an instructor). Barring a cell full of Good Will Huntings there isn’t going to be a (successful self-taught terrorist-in-a-box epidemic. When cells worldwide start VPN-ing a Web conference with Professor Muhammed in Iran, we can re-evaluate.

I think it is telling that “cyber” terrorism to date has centered primarily on Web defacements and low-end DoS attacks. It isn’t that they’re not capable of causing longer/broader denial or disruption, but it violates two tenants that people in CT circles really do get behind; cyber attacks inconvenience, they don’t terrorize, and if the goal is a lot of people watching (vice a lot of people dead) you don’t shut down a key source of information for those you are targeting.

A Little Inspiration

They gathered anxiously that first October morning, the 50 members of the class of “06-01,” the first of 750 new agents-in-training who will graduate from the FBI Academy this year.

Long article that is worth the read. Anyone who has gone through military, para-military or police training can sympathize and empathize to a certain degree. Nice coverage of both the seriousness of the work and the difficulty many people have getting their heads around the change that is about to take place in their lives.

The GWOT Gets Tougher (Update)

Al Qaeda wants to build a political operation in Iraq to broaden its campaign against the U.S.-backed government, a top U.S. general said on Wednesday.

Citing intelligence mostly gathered since the death of al Qaeda’s former leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June, Major General William Caldwell said the militant group appeared to be refining its approach beyond bombings and beheadings.

“Al Qaeda in Iraq wants to present itself as a legitimate organization and is striving to increase its operational power by building a political base with a military wing,” Caldwell told a news briefing. He did not give specific examples.

Hezbollah : Al-Qaida :: Lebanon : Iraq

How do you write “nightmare” in Arabic?

(Update) Question: When AQ becomes Iraq’s Hezbollah, will we be pumping USAID money into the coffers of an organzation that another arm of our government is trying to kill?

FBI: Not Serious

In a classroom at the FBI Academy in Quantico, instructor Rodney Loose was trying to introduce the history of Islam to a new group of future agents. He had one hour.

The 50 men and women would be joining the ranks of an agency whose top officials have declared fighting terrorism to be its No. 1 priority. They listened intently as Loose rushed through his topics: Sunnis and Shiites, the Koran, Mecca and Medina, four-part Arabic names, and the five pillars of Islam.

“Can you tell us about sleeper cells?” a recruit asked.

“I’m sorry, I don’t think we’re going to have time to get into this,” a frustrated Loose said. “I wish I had more time to go through this. But it’s just not possible.”

Since the FBI came under withering criticism for its part in the intelligence community’s failure to prevent the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the bureau has added 37 hours of counterterrorism training at Quantico for new agents. But that represents just 5 percent of the curriculum, and only one hour is about Islam, Arabic culture and understanding the terrorist mind-set

With so little time, Loose could just make it through Page 7 of his 14-page handout. No time to discuss suicide bombers, Islamic extremism or terrorist psychology.

An interesting story for the insights about training, but otherwise a rehash of stuff you have read before. Frankly I don’t know why they’re taking this approach. Use the extra time to focus on broader intelligence skills and create a longer and more focused CT program that Special Agents who are designated for such duty can attend after graduation (basically how everyone in the military is trained; core skills first, extras later). It isn’t like you are churning out thousands of agents a year, so if you’re going to take your time you might as well do it right. Having an add-on course also means that veteran agents who are assigned to CT duty don’t have to learn on-the-job and you can take the training on the road using mobile training teams.

So easy to pick on, but knowing people who are involved in building the training program, I know we shouldn’t yell too loudly.

Bearing Gifted Geeks

The great need for qualified computer security personnel is now forcing the government to rethink rigid hiring guidelines. At the Defcon computer security convention in Las Vegas, more than a dozen federal agents told attendees that traditional requirements like college degrees and polygraph tests were no longer strictly required for government employment. They also said security clearances are being approved quickly.

Apparently, “very gifted” have the chance of being hired even without a high-school degree. “I just spent five and a half hours last night talking with someone who has never graduated high school. And he is one of the most innovative people I know,” said Dr. Linton Wells II, assistant secretary of defense for the Department of Defense.

I have a hard time imagining an ASD sitting down and talking to anyone for five hours, but as they say; what happens in Vegas . . .

Wells explained that the government desperately needs qualified people as 40% of the senior personnel will be retiring during the next few years. With this upcoming shortage, the government is willing to accept people gaining skills away from schools. “The last standing perception of government service is that you need a college degree,” said Wells. He said this perception does not match reality. According to Wells, many employees, contractors and even people in the senior executive service do not have degrees.

Or they have bogus ones.

All well and good for the technical security field, but I would not expect this kind of loosening to take root any time soon in the halls of the larger IC. The idea that a piece of paper – or the “right” kind of paper – automatically conveys some magical powers that are guarantors of success in the field still holds both line bosses and HR shops in a death grip. Any number of security-issue bloggers affiliated with independent organizations have tried and failed to gain entry into the secret world without success. Academic credentials are less of an issue, but the long wait for a full clearance (no “interim” action at the highest levels) and the roll of the dice that is the polygraph is a strong deterrent. Why bother going through the rigmarole when you can be taken just as seriously, be semi-famous, and probably make more money with less overhead doing the thing you enjoy?

Air Security: Not Serious

A top level security probe is under way after a 12-year-old boy walked on to a plane unchecked with no documents at the height of the terror scare. The boy boarded a plane at Gatwick on Monday despite airport security being on red-alert.

 

Want more data points that support the idea that – mechanical and weather issues aside - boarding a plane and arriving at your destination in one piece is a complete crap shoot?

The nation’s top aviation security official says X-ray images are an effective way to detect bombs in shoes.

A Homeland Security Department study says they aren’t.

“Our highly trained transportation security officers can see if a shoe has been tampered with when they view it on the X-ray machine,” [TSA chief] Hawley said.

That 18-year-old at National wearing his TSA uniform pants gangster-style and shooting the breeze with his pal the gray-plastic-tray carrier? Color me unconvinced.

The April 2005 study by the Homeland Security Department states that X-ray images “do not provide the information necessary to effect detection of explosives.”

The report goes on to state that the truth lies somewhere in the middle, but at this point is 50-50 still an acceptable rate of success? The odds of nicking the skin under your stocking feet and picking up the flesh eating virus from the airport floor are probably greater.

Look, we can try to dismiss the plausibility of every disrupted plot that comes along (some for good reason), but the point is they are trying and they have been successful in the past. Our current approach to keeping the skies friendly isn’t working. Horrible as it is to contemplate, I would like to think that another tragic event might b*tch-slap some sense into those charged with keeping us safe. Still, every post-9/11 event to date has shown that our response to more potential tragedy is a heaping helping of more-things-that-don’t-make-us-safer.

Lesson Not Learned

The director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service said Tuesday that the spy agency avoids racial profiling because it is “fundamentally stupid” and does not knowingly use information gleaned under torture offshore because the practice is “morally repugnant.”

James Judd told a gathering of Canadian judges on Tuesday that he is “acutely aware” of complaints that the agency, along with several other organizations, targets the Muslim community in fighting the war on terror. “We don’t profile because it’s fundamentally stupid and we don’t have enough resources,” said Judd. “From a national security perspective, we can’t afford to have whole communities feel alienated.”

Rather, the agency has embarked on community outreach efforts to combat “this legend that this is how we do business,” Judd told a panel discussion on human rights and national security.

Yeah, that ”be nice and they won’t hurt us” strategy is working out really well.

The New Collection / Production Management

In my embargoed contribution to a pending book on reform, I argue that going the networked/wiki-ed/blogged route is both a nice way to cut out a lot of the overhead associated with the intel process. As it works now it is very hierarchical, with gatekeepers at every turn and operating at a pace that makes tortoises look speedy. The commonly referred to “intel cycle” is less a bicycle wheel as it is a millstone. Network the key players together and you get your bicycle wheel and a corresponding increase in speed and performance.

This post at PressThink describes one way to bring order to what I know old-school collection and production managers will say is a chaotic recipe for disaster. Obviously there will be no cash being exchanged, so prioritization and rewards will have to be worked out some other way, perhaps based in part on the NIPF and consumer-ranked quality of input (Ebay model). The nice thing is that efforts that would not make the cut in the old system - fringe stuff that many consider low or no priority - actually have a chance at seeing the light of day. Inevitably not everyone is in the perfect position to fulfill the top requirements. If you’ve got access and means and time, well, it beats sitting idle.

Let the Flailing Begin

Here Comes the Judge

The plot has also revealed the indispensability of good counterterrorism intelligence. A defense against terrorists, as against other enemies of the nation, must be multilayered to have a reasonable chance of being effective. One of the outer defenses is intelligence, designed to detect plots in advance so that they can be thwarted. One of the inner defenses is preventing an attack at the last minute, as by airport screening for weapons.

The inner defense would have failed in the recent episode because the equipment for scanning hand luggage does not detect liquid explosives. (The liquid-bomb threat had been known since a similar al-Qaeda plot was foiled in 1995, but virtually nothing had been done to counter it.) Fortunately, the outer defense succeeded.

Intelligence succeeded in part because of the work of MI5, England’s domestic intelligence agency. We do not have a counterpart to MI5. This is a serious gap in our defenses. Primary responsibility for national security intelligence has been given to the FBI. The bureau is a criminal investigation agency. Its orientation is toward arrest and prosecution rather than toward the patient gathering of intelligence with a view to understanding and penetrating a terrorist network.

One of the sharpest minds on the issue of intel reform and more specifically the cause of a US domestic intelligence capability. When the judge gets appointed to a post in the DNI, you’ll know real progress is on the way. Until then, keep buying PowerBall tickets.

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