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Cherry-Filled NIE on Terrorism (Update)

Wow, the (still classified) NIE on terrorism reportedly points out that the war in Iraq has sown a new crop of Jihadists and ratcheted up the terrorist threat since 9/11/01.

The intelligence estimate, completed in April, is the first formal appraisal of global terrorism by United States intelligence agencies since the Iraq war began, and represents a consensus view of the 16 disparate spy services inside government. Titled “Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States,’’ it asserts that Islamic radicalism, rather than being in retreat, has metastasized and spread across the globe.

An opening section of the report, “Indicators of the Spread of the Global Jihadist Movement,” cites the Iraq war as a reason for the diffusion of jihad ideology.

First, I helped put together one or two NIEs and other NIC documents in my day but even without my insights it should strike everyone as fairly obvious that this assessment likely says a whole lot more than just this heavily flogged and hyped data point. If I had to guess I’d say you’re talking at least 15 pages of material that runs across a wide spectrum of terrorism-related issues, so either that’s 15 pages of variations on the “Iraq is the source of all our woes” theme or there is a certain element at work that would like you to believe that is true by leaving out what the other 14 pages says. I’ll let you guess which is more likely.

Secondly, NIEs are for the most part statements of the obvious. Why? Because an NIE is 99% of what everyone in the IC can agree on. If there is a dissenting view such as:

“Um, guys, radical Islam was in existence, spreading, and targeting US interests well before Iraq”

… it might make a footnote if the will to say so isn’t brow-beaten out of the objector. And as has happened on a number of occasions, what everyone agrees to in person doesn’t always get translated into the text that is passed around for approval. Pointing out that someone has reneged is met with “well, we’re too far along in the process.” So much for that sense of community.

The fact of the matter is that while we hunted for a “worthy” enemy after the Soviet Union fell we did everything we could to avoid picking the right enemy and instead chose the obvious yet questionable one (China). There is a reason why prior to 9/11 guys who talked 4GW were relegated to backwaters; we build tanks and planes and ships really well, and we know how to fight big, fat hierarchies really well, we were never going to pick anything but another nation on which to focus our attention so why bother with this “asymmetric” stuff that doesn’t translate into big hardware and protect a lot of phoney-baloney jobs? All this while we were getting bombed and shot around the world and in our own country. We needed someone big and bad to fight, while the real opposition always had a big, bad enemy to focus on: us. We’ve been “the great satan” since when, the 70s? How ****ing obvious does it get?

My bet is that over the next few days we’ll see a lot more revealed about this NIE, most of it just as obvious and pedestrian as what has been leaked so far, but when taken as a whole is a lot less a statement of “Iraq is a distraction/mistake” as some early leakers would have you believe.

Update: Shocker, it wasn’t 15 pages of the same thing. Similar thought’s at CQ, Strata-Sphere,In from the Cold, SOI, etc.

They Said, They Said

The DOD IG report on Able Danger was released yesterday. I have not had time to read fully, but a once-over suggests to me that either everyone with a whislte in their mouths committed perjury in front of Congress, or this isn’t the most comprehensive report in the world (there seems to be a lot of that going on lately).

Much more at the Able Danger blog . . .

DCIA Hayden Plots a Course (Update)

The CIA’s new director, Gen. Michael V. Hayden, told agency employees yesterday that their intelligence activities are too segmented, saying that operations officers who collect intelligence need to work more closely with the analysts who interpret what it means.*

and

For the analysts, Hayden said he plans to put more emphasis on “expertise and time on target and experience,” along with “pushing analysts overseas.” This continues efforts to reform past practices, in which promotions went to analysts who had served in different types of jobs instead of to those who developed deep expertise in one area. “That reward now could go to someone who has been looking at Iran for 14 years,” Hayden said.

and

He also promised there will be a study of the trend of contracting out intelligence jobs with private firms. “We don’t want to be a farm system for these new firms,” Hayden said, noting that private companies sometimes lure away young officers and analysts once they have their security clearances and have completed a few years with the agency.

I’m aware of one agency’s attempt to bridge the collector-analyst divide and I am aware of exactly one person who was ever able to participate in the program (not me). The gap between these two domains is huge unless you happen to be a rare bird that has worked in both worlds (me). While the policy shift is taking place there also needs to be a set of tools put in place to facilitate the changes. This is where IC adoption of Web 2.0-like capabilities would come in most handily.

I think the second item is arguably the most important shift in thinking within this realm in decades. All those “terminal 12s” at NSA take note that hope springs eternal. Despite a lot of lip-service from past IC regimes, there is really no parallel track to management (where the high-grades are). Every division has one boss and one SIO (both 15s) and the rest get to scrap for what is left (age before capability). Say hello to pay bands folks. If he can make this work, he can chalk up his tenure as a success despite whatever else happens (almost).

Nobody joins the IC to become a contractor. When conditions are such that you have to stop being an intelligence officer and start becoming a COTR your only choice - if you like doing your original job - is becoming a contractor because that’s where the work is. There is also the issue of compensation. Laughing because you low-ball some smart college kid on the GS scale because he’s anxious to do his bit for his Uncle is a recipie for disaster, because after a year he’ll come back with a green/yellow badge making 50% more and doing the same job. Then you are out hustling to fill that billet, which probably ends up costing the government more than if you’d paid the kid decently in the first place. Once again, no one can plan past next Tuesday.

 *Update: Kent’s Imperative is back up on the net (and the ‘Net) with a related post. Welcome back.

It’s Getting Kinda Technic(al)

A reminder that there is more to intelligence and security than policy-wonk stuff . . .

The older I get the less proficient in technology I get, but there was a time when I was fairly ’l33t (get your kids to explain it to you). Today I’m in the running for the world’s worst computer science grad and I’m rapidly becoming a very stale computer forensics practitioner. Still, I can live vicariously through the likes of Bret Pardres and Ovie Carroll, the proprietors behind CyberSpeak, a podcast of forensics and technical security issues. For you DC readers think The Sports Junkies only replace sports with computers.

Bret and Ovie are members of the AFOSI mafia, which seems to have a lock on the forensics business in both government and the private sector. You can’t throw a stick and not hit one of them, which speaks volumes about how seriously the AF takes computer security issues (I’m not sure what it says about AF retention policies). In the interest of full disclosure I’m technically “mobbed up” but have never met these two wise guys.

Why the sudden plug for tech issues? One because I have it on the brain after listening to the podcast while cooling my jets at Dulles all afternoon. Secondly it is a reminder that keeping abreast of technical issues is going to serve you well when you’re considering future threats and vulnerabilities to national security. Spying is still spying, but the ubiquity of computing devices and the growing prevelence of always-available, high-speed connectivity means that the spying game just got a lot easier for one side, and a lot tougher for the other.

Breakfast, not at Tiffany’s (Update)

There was plenty of Splenda thank goodness, which went well with the Japanese-style breakfast.*

CSPAN was there, but it isn’t on the site yet as far as I can tell. Additional press coverage here and here.** Chairman Hoekstra was on his game as always, and Dr. Ledeen was as gracious a host as one could have wanted.

Quick take as I draft my presentation notes (follow below) and listen to ranking member Harman rail on about what a partisan tool the AQ report is, though she is curiously silent about how the minority agreed months ago to the drafting and releasing of these reports. No news is apparently better than good news.

Granted, I can see some of the minority’s point: the committee’s job is oversight, not assessments. Frankly I find the whole idea of members focusing on this issue and not running around to chase the flail of the day to be remarkably refreshing. When there are members that can’t be bothered to read legislation the fact that they took the time to put these reports together is a nice boost of confidence. None of these reports is a groundbreaking piece of work, but they serve to remind people of the vital issues that we face. The administration ought to be taking the lead here but they’re not so instead of slamming the majority for supposedly wasting money I’d rather hear some polite applause.

This latest report in particular emphasizes the role intelligence plays in this and all future conflicts. There is no spot on the planet that we cannot bomb; the trick is finding the right spot to target. This stands in stark contrast to most past wars. The problem of course is that Iran, North Korea, all the places that we are likely to find ourselves in sticky wickets, are hard targets or denied areas. That means a lot of ambiguity in the decision-making mix. In the run up to the next battle in this global conflict, get ready for deja vu all over again.

There is some mention on reform, but I’m not in wholehearted agreement about the changes that have taken place to date. ODNI could prove to be useful, but aside from the CIO and A/DDNI OSINT I’m not hearing of any great movement forward. Consolidation, flattening, better use of technology . . . the list goes on.

We are also reminded that the current 100-yard-dash pace over this 26 mile course isn’t going to cut it. Terrorism is coming but we’re not doing things as smartly as we should. They can strike anywhere at their leisure; we can’t protect everything. AQ has a lot more light infantry to tap than they do pilots. I’m fairly confident that turning Anytown USA into Ramadi is in the cards, yet we focus on airports and stopping the last attack and starve first responders. Where is the new Civil Defense?

Employing the use of all forms of soft power is something that doesn’t get a lot of play but makes a good showing here. We need to make cooperating with us a lot more enjoyable than supporting terrorism or the breeding grounds thereof. That means getting HHS and Ag people ready to deploy (among other things).

I think I might have rambled on about one or two other things, but I’ve had it for now.

* Plenty of lox, not a bagel in sight.

** To the best of my knowledge I didn’t “blast” the DNI by name, but I did say that recycling the old-school workforce wasn’t the smartest thing in the world. It is the DC solution though, so what can you do?

How Not to Promote Sharing

The Homeland Security Information Network came under fire today from the Homeland Security Department’s Office of the Inspector General, which said management and trust problems have undermined the project.

HSIN was intended to be a network for developing and disseminating threat alerts, notifications and warnings among public safety organizations, emergency personnel, and state and local officials.

But privacy concerns and inadequate planning and resources have stymied efforts to make HSIN a viable information-sharing solution for government agencies, said Frank Deffer, DHS’ assistant IG.

One of the inescapable aspects of a bureaucracy, especially a new one, is the desire to put a unique stamp on things or in a worst-case scenario to re-invent the wheel. The whole idea of a HSIN is great, but it already existed in the form of the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers; public-private partnerships that had been used to exchange information and collaborate years before DHS came around. Instead of using what was already there and working, DHS pushed for HSIN and predictably; ISACs pushed back. ISACs are still standing and working; HSIN . . . eh, not so much.

All government “sharing” initiatives suffer from the same delusional thinking: that a top-down push to share is the solution to our collaboration woes. The fact of the matter it that pubic-private, public-public, and private-private sharing goes on all the time, at mostly working levels, and with great success. GroupIntel forums and wiki are good examples, but there are others. Providing the tools/environment and making introductions works better than official mandates because you can’t force people to trust people. That’s something that all the secret-world entities trying to reinvent themselves as sharers have yet to grasp.

Cyber Security: Captain Wanted (Update)

One can have varying degrees of concern over “cyber” terrorism or how badly we might suffer were someone to go EBO on us, but I think we can all agree that while planning may continue, a rudderless ship is still unlikely to reach its destination. We have been hearing about what a high priority this has been for about a year now, and reportedly a “very qualified” individual is about to step up to the plate. Given the large pool of qualified people in the field I find it hard to believe that things have taken this long, which suggests that “priority” means something else on Nebraska Ave.

Money is less an issue than some would have you believe. Amit had Riptech money so his salary was basically walking around money. Plenty of well-off executives who could have pulled this off, but if I had to guess they stay away for basically the same reason why most pros in other fields give the stiff-arm to DHS job offers: the place is unworkable. I would have a different take if the early tales about overcrowding, lack of the most fundamental resources, ridiculous hours and security madness unheard of even in the IC had faded, but they have not.

You might want to bone up on your Q & Z signals and renew that ham license.

Update:

The Homeland Security Department announced today that Gregory Garcia has been appointed as the assistant secretary for cybersecurity and telecommunications.

I’ve given up saying, “never heard of him” when it comes to these hiring decisions. The proof wil be in the pudding.

The Lab No One Ever Heard Of

Ha! Aha! Ahahahahahahaha!

DIA’s approach [to organizational change was] based on three principles. First, the agency discovered that any mechanism to facilitate change must be positioned outside DIA’s business units and must have the protection of top leadership. Second, it saw that structuring this mechanism should be done through raids - short-term pilot projects - instead of battles or sieges. Agency leaders insisted that the pilot take place where the work actually was being done - at the practice level. To overcome what DIA called the “zero-sum game constraint,” the mechanism could not occupy its own separate physical space, could not have resources other than one person and minimal funding, and should create a network of volunteers - revolutionaries - to spread new behaviors discovered through pilot projects. DIA named the new mechanism the Knowledge Laboratory.[...]

By the end of 2005, the Knowledge Laboratory achieved a reputation for excellence inside DIA as well as from intelligence colleagues, other agencies, academia and business. From DIA’s perspective, it earned this reputation by attacking the right problem and making small changes and improvements in core processes. The right problem was a lack of collaboration within DIA. The right solution was to allow seeking, creating and sharing knowledge to trump organizational impediments.

Aha, ha, heh . . . whew . . . man, sometimes I slay myself.

Having been there during the timeframe I have to say that this was either the blackest program in the SAP room or this report is some kind of cruel hoax. Since they’re talking about it, it must not be a SAP. Basing your change efforts on those of another government agency? That strategy is absurd on its face. Wild success in two years that broke down barriers and led to a magical world of sharing and collaboration? Either all my former colleagues are lying to me, or this is the world’s biggest puff piece. In the immortal words of Public Enemy: Don’t believe the hype.

Thinking you can’t go radical because the nature of the work is so special that you’ll end up losing the farm is a sucker’s game. You’ll still get the ulcer but it’ll all be for nothing. The farm has been bet for us and we’d better come up with the best hand we can fast.

Monday Quick Hits

Quick turn around back to DC so enjoy these tidbits while I try to carve out some time for something more substantial:

• The War on Terror just got a lot harder, thanks to our “ally”
• Another data point on the generally bizarre clearance process.
• Still more details on why the SSCI report is at best a case for waste, fraud and abuse of GPO resources and Senate staffer time.
• CI taking still more bruises on its handling of PRC spy issues. Makes one wonder just what impact the purge of NCIX leadership was really about.
• Another story about the self-licking ice cream cone of IC contracting. If the only place you can actually do intelligence work is with a contractor, why stick with the gov’t and be a de facto contracting officer rep?
• Domestic Spying! Where is the outrage?
  
• On the political front; when you can’t get people fired up about some made-up pol-sec issue the first time . . . take a Mulligan.

It’s Academic

I can now join the TSA queue and prepare for my probing with a smile knowing that my latest Standard piece is available for your reading pleasure.  Thanks to Tom for the shout-out.

Folks, if you think the SSCI report is anything but a political tool, you are deluding yourself. Should we expect more? Perhaps if this had been a CRS or GAO effort, but like most of us staffers have day jobs that won’t wait while research and analysis efforts go on (kind of like working in the IC in general). I know people on the staffs of both house committees and they’re not slouches by any stretch. A valiant effort given the circumstances, but hardly definitive.

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