Define “Bigger”
January 19, 2007
(cross-posted at Haft of the Spear)
I don’t get Insight Magazine so I don’t know the full story that goes along with this teaser:
The U.S. intelligence community has assessed that Osama bin Laden has benefited from a secure haven in Pakistan that allows him to plan a major attack on the U.S.
It took all of about an hour after this to hit the Web before various colleagues started to exchange thoughts on the matter, and like a well indoctrinated, NIC-conditioned drone I threw this wrench into the works:
“Define the term ‘bigger’. We’re assuming “bigger” means more spectacular in approach.”
The numerous weaknesses in airline security are well documented. The “security theater” that surrounds most supposed high-value targets/industries/infrastructure means there is less of a chance of a hijacking, but a bomb in the cargo hold – or a gas-filled tanker into city hall - is all too real an option. Hell, ratchet up the poop-to-lettuce ratio and you can send dozens of infidels to the hospital and probably kill a few too.
Bigger defined as more spectacular is an option, but the goal is terrorism, not something suitable for Broadway. As soon as airlines could fly after 9/11 people got on board; when the DC beltway snipers were loose everyone who had to leave their car was OJ Simpson (the Hertz version). There is no reason why the next grand plan might not originate farther down the amazing scale because simple works and if done close to home it hits close to home.
Consider these figures from data I borrowed from the Bookings Institution (PDF):
- IEDs have killed an average of 23 GIs/month since the start of the war.
- October of last year saw a peak of 52 troop deaths via IEDs.
The tactic varies, but generally speaking we’re talking about taking out 3-4 guys at a time in a HMMWV or on a dismounted patrol.
Now, add a little crude homeland-based math:
- A city bus in a major metro area at rush hour might hold 80 people.
- A light rail car might hold more than 100
- A vehicle-borne IED stopped in the middle of a traffic jam might take out a dozen or more people depending on the size of the vehicle and charge.
Coordinated to take place on the same day at the same time (London calling), cells in just the top ten US cities (let’s say a dozen-per – somewhere between the Miami 7 and Toronto 18) it is not inconceivable that a coordinated IED attack could kill significantly more innocents in the US than GIs in Iraq, and three times as many as those killed on 9/11 (80 bus passengers x 12 bombers x 10 cities = 9,600)
Is that “bigger” enough for UBL?
“Tanji, you’re just trying to justify this post.”
Possibly, but if the methodology of our adversary is violence-driven political/religious change, I can’t think of a better way to ride the recent domestic political wave than to focus my attention on the electorate.
Thoughts?
Coalition of the Dastardly
January 11, 2007
(Cross posted to Haft of the Spear)
I engaged in several conversations about cyber threats this past week and each conversant repeated with certainty a lack of concern over a relationship between terrorists and mobsters in the virtual world. I’d like to think that an unholy alliance of that sort isn’t possible, but . . .
I don’t know that we’re ever going to see “cyber” placed in front of terrorism like “bio” or “nuclear” is today. Not that it won’t be possible, but as a wise man once said, “terrorists like a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead.” Any T who is savvy enough to look at the Internet and related technologies as a weapons platform is also going to recognize that in the land of The Great Satan ™, more and more people are getting their information via online sources. Shut down the ‘Net and you drastically reduce the number of people watching (and as far as I know past localized outages failed to kill anyone).
The other big Internet boogie man is disruption, which can be a real pain in the rear, but not something people are going to panic over. It’s the war on terror, not the war on inconvenience. The economy would take a hard kick in the groin, but that virtual representation of your bank balance still translates into real money at some point. Now you’d just have to go and see a teller for it (how very 70s).
And money, speaking of which, is the nexus that some of my contemporaries seem to be missing. The reporting (public and private) is legion and it all points to one conclusion: a functioning ‘Net facilitates every non-kinetic terrorism-related activity. As I and others have pointed out, they can use it to recruit, spread propaganda, do pre-op planning, share TTP, and raise funds via legitimate or illegitimate means. That latter part is increasingly being controlled or facilitated (opinions vary) by organized crime.
Why is fund raising important? UBL isn’t cutting quarterly dividend checks to his franchisees. Running a global enterprise – even an illicit one – takes money. You need a lot of money, regularly, quickly, and you don’t care about Johnny Law then the answer is Willie Sutton obvious.
Is OC and AQ going to team up in some sort of bilateral team of super villains? To an extent I think the answer is “yes.”
You can nickel and dime your way to illicit wealth online, or you can make a modest investment and bring home some serious coin. That’s only going to happen if you cut a deal with the guys in shiny suits or “a friend of theirs.” Online crime networks are global, diverse (in the practical and political sense), sophisticated and very equal opportunity: they’ll deal with anyone who has the right data or l33t skillz. Ideologically speaking there is no real tie that would bind, but that whole “Sunis won’t deal with Shias” canard is rotting in the street and “conscience” and “mafiya” aren’t exactly terms that are heard together very often.
The question then becomes: can you help stop or hamstring terrorism by stopping or hindering organized crime (or more specifically online crime)? Again, to an extent the answer is “yes.”
We know what it takes to bust up OC rings, but the LCN of the 70s and 80s isn’t the Russian or Asian mobs of today; we might not be on as solid a tactical footing as we think. Since most of the activity we are trying to fight is carried out virtually and well outside the jurisdiction of US authorities, even if you infiltrate a gang, you will likely never meet face to face and facilitate an arrest (Oh no, look out Ivan, a strongly worded demarche!). Just the sheer scale of events has swamped our best law enforcement efforts; they have not been without success, but the little boy with his fingers in the dike had things well in hand for a while too.
Municipalities across the country are offering broadband wifi to their citizens, people are carrying more and more IP-enabled devices with PII that could be converted into cash, banks are starting to offer mobile-device-enabled banking (with requisite security issues unresolved): the aforementioned problems are only going to get worse. Even some of the more radical solutions (toot-toot) are likely to be limited in effectiveness. This is another non-kinetic way to help fight the war (Iraqi jobs program, IO programs, etc.) but is it worth pursuing? Is there a viable alternative?
